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Abstract
This note provides a way to translate a strategic game to a characteristic
cooperative game assuming that the set of players of the cooperative game is
the set of pure actions of the strategic game. Coalitions generated with only one
action for each player and the total coalition characterize the Core. We calculate
the worth of the total coalition to guarantee the non-emptyness condition. In
particular, for a two-player game, this value is equal to the maximal sum of the
diagonals.
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1 Introduction
Strategic and cooperative behavior are not mutually exclusive as numerous papers
have shown (e.g. Nash 1953, Rai a 1953, Selten 1960 Aumann 1961). There is also
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1(e.g. Roth 1979, Rabin 1993, Binmore 1994, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Camerer 2003).
Consistent with these two streams of the literature, is the notion that some agents
prefer cooperating or, in other words, they can be benevolent with other agents in
strategic situations. In light of this, we ask ourselves how those benevolent agents
would play in a strategic situation formalized as a normal form game if they were
considering that either their payo  or that of their opponents could be transferred,
(i.e., a cooperative game with transferable utility, TU-games).
This note presents a cooperative game approach to study strategic situations
with agents of a marked cooperative proﬁle. Namely, we inquire about the minimal
value that highly cooperative agents would need to support agreements immune to
blockades of coalitions. Given a normal form game we construct a new cooperative
game such that i) the set of agents in the new cooperative game is the union of all
pure actions of the original game; ii) the characteristic function is tailored such that
any collection of actions gives the maximal worth. In particular, it is the maximal of
the sum of the payo s associated to this action proﬁle. The ﬁrst assumption follows
from Harsanyi’s interpretation of a bayesian player playing an incomplete game. The
ﬁctitious agents are deﬁned following the type-agent representation of Bayesian games
suggested by Harsanyi: the actions of each agent are interpreted as their type in such
class of games. In our case, each action could be considered as a di erent type where
the opponent has the information on the set of types for each player. The second
assumption establishes a positive case. Using an utilitarian criterion, we extrapolate
the behavior of the players. If agents are strongly cooperative, they see their payo 
as the opponent payo  and viceversa. Therefore, the sum of their payo s is the best
combination of their achievement.
Our result establishes the existence of the total coalition value in order to guar-
antee the existence of the Core solution accepted in the literature. Moreover, we
present a characterization of such a value using only the relevant coalition for the
non-cooperative game. In other words, coalitions generated with only one action for
each player and the total coalition matter. In particular, for a two-player game, this
value is equal to the maximal sum of the diagonals.
In Cooperative Games, there is a wide literature which gives a strategic interpre-
tation to cooperative solutions (see the survey of Highland, 2009). Our approach is
the opposite. In a similar vein, Ui (2000) gives a relationship between strategic games
with potential and the Shapley value of a particular class of cooperative games in-
dexed by the set of strategy proﬁles. This fact is in contrast with the large literature
that gives strategic interpretation to cooperative solutions (see the survey of Serrano,
2009).
The note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the construction of a family
of cooperative games from a strategic game. Section 3 characterizes the endorsement
associated to a strategic game by characterizing the Core of the cooperative game.
2Finally, the computation of such value for a two-player game closes the note.
2 From (G,u) to { ,v} 
Let (G,u) = (N,Si,u i : i NSi   R) be a strategic game where N = {1,...,n}
is the ﬁnite set of players, Si = {i1,...,im} the action set and ui represents the
utility function of player i. From (G,u) we generate a family of coalitional games
denoted by { ( )}  R+. Each coalitional game in such family is deﬁned by both the
set of players and the characteristic function v. The function v assigns a worth to any
possible coalition of players. First, let’s translate any action k of each player i denoted
by ik to an agent of the new coalitional cooperative game. We call these agents as
types. Therefore, each action of player i from the original game G corresponds with
a type at the new coalition game  . Denote by Nn =  i NSi the set of agents in  
and for all coalition S   Nn, and  i(S)=S   Si corresponds with the actions that
player i participates.
Deﬁne  ( ) = (Nn,v ) with v  :2 Nn   R where
v
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The ﬁrst condition says that any coalition of types which does not represent a
possible action proﬁle in G has zero worth. The second one sets up the worth of
a coalition S where any player is active by at least one action, i.e.:  i(S)  =  . In
particular, if |S| = n and  i(S)  =  ,  i   N then v (S)=
 
i ui( 1(S),..., N(S)).
The last condition states the worth of the total coalition. We call   the endorsement
of the game G and we look for conditions on   to guaratee cooperative solution in
 ( ).
3 The endorsement of cooperation
This section presents the characterization of the Core of  ( ) denoted by C( ( )).
In order to prove proposition 1, we apply the characterization of balanced games to
state the existence of non-empty Core. Thereafter, we propose a way to describe
the Core using coalitions in  ( ) where each player participates with only one of her
actions. Finally, we state the minimum   for 2-players game in order to guarantee a
non-emptiness Core. We call this amount as the endorsement of G .
3Proposition 1 There exists  > 0 such that C( ( ))  =  .
Proof. Notice that  ( ) is a balanced game for an   large enough, namely, for
  =
 
S 2Nn v(S). By using Bondavera-Shapley theorem (M. J. Osborne and A.
Rubinstein,1995. ppp 262 Proposition 262.2),  ( ) has nonempty core.
Given that family of cooperative games { ( )}  with non empty Core, by conti-
nuity and zero bounded restriction, it is easy to check the existence of the solution of
the problem min( ) subject to Core( ( ))  =  . Let ˜   be the solution of the above
problem.
The value ˜   represents the minimal investment in order to preclude the blocking
of coalitions, in particular those coalitions linked to a proﬁle of action of G. Let
K = {S   Nn, |S| = n and S   Si  =   for all i   N} be the set1 of coalitions with
non-zero worth. From K, we deﬁne a new set K( ( )) which consist of the set of
imputations determined by inequalities written only for coalitios in K. Therefore,
any proﬁle of actions in G represents a inequality in K( ( )). Formally:
K ( ( )) =
 





xi   v
 (S)  S   K and
 
i Nn
xi =  
 
The proposition below states that the Core of  ( ) is equal to the set K( ( )).
Proposition 2 C( ( )) = K ( ( ))
Proof. It is straightforward that C( ( ))   K ( ( )). In order to prove that
K ( ( ))   C( ( )), it is enough to see that
 
i S
xi   v
 (S) if  i(S)  =   for all i and |S| >n
for all imputation x   K ( ( )).
Let S   Nn such that |S| = n +1 and  i(S)  =   for all i   N. Suppose w.l.o.g
that the ﬁrst action for all players is in S and the second action of player 1, i.e.:









1Notice that K is isomorphic to the cartesian product of Si, i.e.: K =  i NSi.
4If x   K ( ( )) it satisﬁes that:
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by the non negative condition, we get:
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ui(12,21,31,...,n1) ) = v
 (S)
Therefore x   C ( ( )) and the result hold.
The next proposition depicts the value ˜   for the family of two players games. In
particular, the value ˜   is either the sum of the principal diagonal of the payo  matrix
or the sum of the other diagonal.
Consider the following notation for the matrix payo  of G =( {1,2},S i = {0,1},u i)
a two person game:
20 21
10 a00,b 00 a01,b 01
11 a10,b 10 a11,b 11
Proposition 3 Suppose that a00 + b00   aij + bij   (i,j)  = (0,0). Then ˜   = a00 +
b00 + a11 + b11 or ˜   = a01 + b01 + a10 + b10.
Proof. Given that ˜   is the lowest value of the total coalition such that Core( ( ))
is not empty, let’s solve the following problem:
Min xi0 + xi1 + xj0 + xj1
s.t. xi0 + xj0   a00 + b00
xi0 + xj1   a01 + b01
xi1 + xj0   a10 + b10
xi1 + xj1   a11 + b11
5The min contition allows us to write the problem as:
Min a00 + b00 + xi1 + xj1
s.a. xi0 + xj1   a01 + b01
xi1 + xj0   a10 + b10
xi1 + xj1   a11 + b11
Adding the ﬁrst and the second restriction, we obtain that xi1 +xj1   a01 +b01 +
a10 + b10   a00   b00. Given the ﬁrst condition, then the minimum is:
˜   = a00 + b00 + max{a11 + b11,a 01 + b01 + a10 + b10   a00   b00}
and the result holds.
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